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COPYRIGHT LAW AND DIGITAL PIRACY:
AN ECONOMETRIC GLOBAL CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY
Antoni Terra*
Digital piracy is a worldwide concern. Both very high and very
low rates of intellectual property infringement threaten innovation,
thus implying that some level of effective copyright regulation is
required to incentivize the creation of original works. However,
although Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
advocates for social access to culture as well as the protection of
copyright, many countries do not yet have an economic and legal
balance between authors and consumers.
This article aims to identify which copyright law measures are
more related to low/high digital piracy rates. To address that
question, the author presents a picture of how the world of
copyright is today. The empirical law and economics methodology
used in this paper thus consists of a content analysis of
significantly selected copyright law measures that have been more
or less broadly implemented, or that have been dismissed by 108
countries in their current national copyright statutes. After
processing the resultant database (or coding scheme) with
econometric and descriptive statistical tools, the findings suggest
that: (1) the legal measures correlated to high digital piracy rates
include the sweat of the brow doctrine and secondary liability
*
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rules for Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”); (2) the measures
most connected to low piracy rates are private copying and fair
use provisions; (3) statutes that favor copyright holders are
associated with greater rates of digital piracy; and (4) richer
countries show lower levels of copyright infringement, which
validates the development economics theory. Because there is no
extant literature on this topic, these results constitute the first step
toward a comprehensive cross-national quantitative study on
comparative copyright law and digital piracy, both in descriptive
and explanatory terms.
Without doubt, this project will excite scholars in economics
and intellectual property but will also intrigue international
policymakers as the outcomes of this study provide core policy
guidelines on copyright that legislatures and governments around
the
world
can
implement.
These
interdisciplinary
recommendations are in line with designing a new and
economically viable regulatory copyright model which aims to
reduce piracy rates and to solve the global tension between
authors and consumers in the digital era.
From the earliest days at Apple, I realized that we thrived
when we created intellectual property.
If people copied or stole our software, we’d be out of business.
If it weren’t protected, there’d be no incentive for us
to make new software or product designs.
If protection of intellectual property begins to disappear,
creative companies will disappear or never get started.
But there’s a simpler reason: It’s wrong to steal.
It hurts other people. And it hurts your own character.
Steve Jobs1

I. INTRODUCTION
Technological advances expand society’s capabilities to new
frontiers previously unimaginable. The classic contemporary

1

WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 396 (2011).
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example is the Malthusian problem2 that governed the world since
the dawn of man and was shattered by the technological
developments which stimulated the Industrial Revolution. 3
Approximately two hundred years later, the Digital Revolution,
reinvigorated in the 1960s by Jack Kilby’s 4 invention of the
microchip, has given new momentum to technological
advancements intended to enhance our quality and enjoyment of
life. It is clear that technology enhances human progress; however,
its power can threaten creativity if not effectively regulated
through intellectual property laws. This field, lying at the
intersection of law, economics, science, and technology, has
experienced a dramatic shift since the birth of the Internet,
enabling copyright infringement in ways never before conceived.
Hence, to fight against digital piracy, the proper treatment of
copyright must become a legal policy priority issue which
integrates an economic perspective.5

2

THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION,
13–17 (J. Johnson, London 1798) (exhibiting Malthus’ analysis on how
humanity would survive if the population increased in geometric progression
while agricultural output grew arithmetically).
3
See GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS: A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF THE WORLD, 2 Fig. 1.1 (Joel Mokyr ed., 2007),
http://wiki.dpi.inpe.br/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=ser457cst310:a_clark_farewell_to_alms.pdf. It was precisely the transformation in
production and energy that occurred between 1760 and 1830, id. at 3, that
allowed society to escape the “Malthusian trap,” in which discoveries did not
necessarily yield improvements in quality of life as the overall increase in
wealth was offset by the increase in population Id. at 1–3. It was only after the
Industrial Revolution that society had the necessary mechanisms to trigger the
per capita income growth and the chance to finally start living better. Id.
4
The Nobel Prize in Physics 2000, NOBEL MEDIA,
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2000/ (last visited
Sept. 12, 2016) (“The Nobel Prize in Physics 2000 was awarded . . . to Jack S.
Kilby for his part in the invention of the integrated circuit.”).
5
See Green Paper: Unlocking the Potential of Cultural and Creative
Industries, 2-3, COM (2010) 183 final (Apr. 27, 2010). The “cultural and
creative industries” (“CCI”) accounted for 2.6% of the European Union’s GDP
in 2010, and they provided employment to approximately five million people
within the EU. Id. In the United States, CCI, known as “core copyright
industries,” represented 6.4% of its GDP in 2010, and accounted for 3.9% of
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The former Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court Sandra Day O’Connor (1981-2006) rightly emphasized in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.6 that the
existence of an economic and legal balance between authors and
consumers should be the guiding principle of any copyright
legislation:
The primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts’ [Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution]. To
this end, copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by
a work. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate.
It is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.7
Professor Neil W. Netanel complemented Justice O’Connor’s
vision with no less erudition: “Copyright law’s perennial dilemma
is to determine where [authors’] exclusive rights should end and
unrestrained public access should begin.”8
The United States implemented the 1976 Copyright Act and
subsequent amendments to achieve a fair compromise between
authors and consumers to incentivize creativity, innovation, and
originality; nonetheless, many countries have not yet reached this
point. Thus, although Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights advocates for cultural participation as well as the
protection of copyright, 9 digital piracy unfortunately remains a

employment. Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The
2011 Report, 5–10, International Intellectual Property Alliance 13 (2011).
6
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
7
Id.
8
Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 285 (1996).
9
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 Art. 27 (1948), “1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
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worldwide concern. For instance, according to the BSA Global
Software Survey 2016, 10 whose numbers are illustrative but
probably overestimated, the world unlicensed PC software
installation rate is 39%. Moreover, for the top 20 economies in
commercial value of unlicensed PC software, the differences are
striking: 17–24% for the United States, Japan, Australia, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands; 34-52% for
France, South Korea, Spain, Italy, Brazil, and Mexico; and 58-84%
for India, Russia, Argentina, Thailand, China, Vietnam, and
Indonesia. 11 As will be later measured, unlicensed software
installation rates are statistically greater for younger industrialized
countries.
Hence, to shed light on the global piracy rate problem, which is
of an empirical nature but has policy implications, the research
question that this article aims to answer is explanatory-based:
“which copyright law measures are more related to low/high
digital piracy rates?” This analysis relies primarily on data from
WIPO Lex,12 the BSA Software Alliance (“BSA”),13 and the World
Bank14 and represents a picture of how the copyright universe is
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.”
10
Seizing Opportunity Through License Compliance: BSA Global Software
Survey 2016, BSA, THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, 7, (May 2016),
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2016/downloads/studies/BSA_GSS_US.pdf; see also
Piracy of Digital Content, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/piracyofdigitalcontent.htm;
David
Price,
Sizing the piracy universe, NETNAMES (Sept. 2013),
http://copyrightalliance.org/sites/default/files/2013-netnames-piracy.pdf. But see
Ivan P. L. Png, On the Reliability of Software Piracy Statistics (Electronic
Commerce Research and Applications, Working Paper No. 5),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099325.
11
Seizing Opportunity Through License Compliance: BSA Global Software
Survey 2016, supra note 10.
12
WIPO LEX, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
13
THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, BSA Global Software Survey: The Compliance
Gap,
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2013/downloads/studies/2013GlobalSurvey_Study_en
.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
14
WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, http://data.worldbank.org (last visited Sept. 12,
2016).
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today. Thus, the empirical law and economics methodology
employed here (see infra Section II) consists of a content analysis
of significantly selected copyright law measures that have been
more or less broadly implemented, or that have been dismissed, by
108 countries in their current national copyright statutes.
This article is divided in three main sections: literature review,
methodology, and analysis-results. Regarding the latter, after a
descriptive statistics note (Section III.A) the resultant database is
processed with econometric tools to (1) identify the copyright law
mechanisms (and/or control variables) that are more related to
low/high digital piracy rates (Section III.B.1), 15 and (2) assess
whether statutes that generally favor copyright holders or those
that favor consumers are associated with lower or higher rates of
digital piracy (Section III.B.2). Therefore, based on its econometric
results on copyright law mechanisms and/or control variables that
are more related to low digital piracy rates, this article provides
strategic guidelines and recommendations to intellectual property
policymakers worldwide (Section III.C). That way, legislatures and
governments have up-to-date empirical data to build a new and
economically viable copyright model to correct the global tension
between authors and consumers in the digital era, which would
lead society to greater heights of wellbeing. Finally, to test their
accuracy, the proposed policy guidelines are applied to the
particular cases of the United States and Spain (Section III.D).
Because there is no existing literature in the field with the
scope that this article offers (see Section I), these results constitute
the first step toward a comprehensive cross-national quantitative
study on comparative copyright law and digital piracy, both in
descriptive and explanatory terms.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are no econometric studies assessing the relation
between piracy rates, copyright laws, and socioeconomic variables
15

The author coded, for instance, how broad the fair use doctrine or secondary
liability rules for ISPs are in the selected 108 jurisdictions, and then used
econometrics to observe their relationship with the respective national digital
piracy rate.
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across countries in a quantitative and internationally
comprehensive fashion. Thus, one of the main contributions of this
project is to fill the gap in the extant literature. However, papers
addressing some particular issues of what this article directly or
indirectly covers have been published. One can identify at least
three lines of research in the previous literature that are significant
for our purposes: the first, central, and still very unexplored line
assesses the relationship between copyright law and digital piracy
(it also aims tangentially at copyright regulation and sales). The
second category focuses on development economics and its effect
on intellectual property infringement. Finally, the third group is
devoted to works that explain why individuals decide whether to
engage in digital piracy. Moreover, this literature review includes a
broadly examined field regarding digital piracy and sales as well as
a final section about general reflections on copyright. These two
latter areas of knowledge are not part of this article, but they have
been included in the interest of completeness.
A. Effects of Copyright Law on Digital Piracy and Sales
One of the relevant trends in this field analyzes how
strengthening laws against copyright infringement affects digital
piracy, which is one of the main concerns of this project. Thus far
in the literature, this issue has only been examined from an ad hoc
perspective or from a theoretical standpoint. This paper combines
both a comprehensive and an empirical approach to address
whether harsher laws and their enforcement mechanisms are
related to lower piracy rates.
On the one hand, for the nature of this research, explanatory
conclusions are not achievable through qualitative comparative
studies on copyright, as the studies are much more suitable to
understand the nuances of this discipline from a descriptive angle.16
16

Sanjeev Chaswal, Comparative Study of the Main Features of Copyright
Law in India, INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE (2012); ALKA CHAWLA, LAW OF
COPYRIGHT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2013) (analyzing India, United
Kingdom, United States, and the European Union); Shruti Rana, The Global
Battle Over Copyright Reform: Developing the Rule of Law in the Chinese
Business Context, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND FRANCIS KING CAREY SCHOOL OF
LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (2013) (analyzing United States,
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On the other hand, the ad hoc econometric papers on copyright
provide contradictory evidence on whether tougher laws to fight
copyright infringement increase or decrease digital piracy. This
article addresses this issue in Section III.B. For instance, the 2009
implementation of the HADOPI law in France,17 which was later
revoked on July 8, 2013, is one of the best-known recent examples
of this kind of literature. HADOPI introduced a graduated response
in an attempt to increase compliance with copyright laws, the socalled “three strikes” where individuals received a warning the first
Japan, and Taiwan); Phil Sherrell (Ed.), International Comparative Legal Guide
to Copyright 2015, GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP (2014) (analyzing 23 countries);
COPYRIGHT INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL. XIV,
(Eugen Ulmer & Gerhard Schricker eds., 2007) (using qualitative studies to
compare different national copyright laws).
There are also works within this qualitative category focused on specific
matters, such as copyright clearance (Ñusta Nina, Final Guidelines on Copyright
Clearance and IPR Management (eContentplus, ECP-2007-DILI-517006,
2010)), copyright limitations (Tatiana Brazhnik, How to Balance Interests:
Comparative Legal Aspects on the Limitation of Copyright in International Law
(National Research University Higher School of Economics, Working Paper No.
WP BRP 41/LAW/2014, 2014)), linking and framing (Ignacio Garrote, Linking,
Framing and Copyright: A Comparative Law Approach (2001)), peer-to-peer
file-sharing and third party liability (Guy Pessach, An InternationalComparative Perspective on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing and Third Party
Liability in Copyright Law: Framing the Past, Present, and Next Generations’
Questions, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 87–133 (2007) (analyzing Australia,
Canada, and United States)), and video games (ANDY RAMOS, ET AL., THE
LEGAL STATUS OF VIDEO GAMES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN NATIONAL
APPROACHES (2013) (analyzing 24 countries)). The International Comparative
Legal Guide to Copyright 2015 edited by Sherrell includes the following 23
jurisdictions: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany,
Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway,
Philippines, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, and United States. The study on the legal status of video games
prepared by Ramos, López, Rodríguez, Meng, and Abrams covers 24 countries:
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, and United States.
17
Loi n°2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la
création sur internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009], LEGIFRANCE
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020735432&d
ateTexte=&categorieLien=id (promoting the distribution and protection of
creative works on the Internet).
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two times they were detected illegally sharing content through peer
to peer (“P2P”) networks, and only when a third violation was
identified was legal action taken. 18 Applying a difference-indifference approach to a panel of iTunes sales data from the four
major music labels (Universal Music, Warner Music, EMI Music,
and Sony Music) across a broad set of European countries,
Danaher et al. found that “increased consumer awareness of
HADOPI caused French iTunes music sales to increase by 2225%.”19 However, Arnold et al., using survey data from French
Internet users, concluded that the HADOPI law did not have a
substantial deterrent effect on individuals’ decision to engage in
digital piracy for the first time. 20 Instead, he argued that “the
increased [iTunes sales in France were] likely to have been caused
by public educational efforts and increased information about legal
channels that coincided with the introduction of that law.” 21
Similarly, Gavaldà-Miralles et al.22 analyzed a two-year-long userlevel trace of download activity of over 38,000 people from around
18

ACT TO PROMOTE THE DISSEMINATION AND PROTECTION OF CREATION ON
THE INTERNET, http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/pjl07-405.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2016).
19
Brett Danaher, Michael D. Smith, Rahul Telang & Siwen Chen, The Effect
of Graduated Response Anti-Piracy Laws on Music Sales: Evidence From an
Event Study in France, 62 J. OF INDUS. ECON., 541, 541 (2014),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.12056/pdf; but see Will Tovey,
An Analysis of Claimed Relationships between iTunes Sales in France and
Hadopi, LEGAL PIRACY, (2012),
https://legalpiracy.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/hadopi-and-itunes1.pdf
(expressing doubts about the reliability of the study when analyzing its 2012
version due to its economic methodology and in the interpretation of its results).
20
Michael Arnold, Eric Darmon, Sylvain Dejean, & Thierry Penard,
Graduated Response Policy and the Behavior of Digital Pirates: Evidence from
the French Three-strike (Hadopi) Law, Univ. of Del. Alfred Lerner College of
Business & Econ., Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 2014-07, at 4 (2014),
http://www.lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/ECON/PDFs/RePEc/dlw/Working
Papers/2014/UDWP2014-07.pdf.
21
Id.
22
Arnau Gavaldà-Miralles, John S. Otto, Fabián E. Bustamante, Luis A.N.
Amaral, Jordi Duch, & Roger Guimerà, User Behavior and Change: Filesharers and Copyright Laws, PROC. OF THE 10TH ACM INT’L CONF. ON
EMERGING NETWORKING EXPERIMENTS AND TECH., 319–324 (2014),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2674005.2675009.
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the world. One of their most interesting outcomes was that when
the New Zealand “three-strikes” law took effect, the reduction in
file-sharing activity of copyrighted content lasted only two
months.23 After that initial period, digital piracy returned to the
level observed prior to the law being enacted.
Joining this more pessimistic view on how copyright laws can
influence digital piracy, Orme analyzed the short- and long-term
effectiveness of six major U.S. anti-piracy government actions on
the box-office revenues of the motion-picture industry. 24 His
results showed that, “with one notable exception [the NET Act],25
these laws have either been ineffective or counter-productive from
the perspective of the film studios.” 26 Thus, according to the
author, those stricter policies designed to limit piracy actually
decreased box-office revenue, perhaps because they
unintentionally fostered an increase in the number of downloads of
films.27
However, again, there are other papers that seem more
confident in the positive effects of copyright law (and related
government and judicial policies) to reduce digital piracy:
Bhattacharjee et al. found that the Recording Industry Association
of America’s highly publicized lawsuits against P2P sharers
significantly reduced the availability of pirated files.28 In addition,
23

COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT ACT 2011 (N.Z.) NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION,
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2011/0011/latest/DLM3331813.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
24
Tylor Orme, The Short- And Long-Term Effectiveness of Anti-Piracy Laws
and Enforcement Actions, 38 J. OF CULTURAL ECON. 351, 354–356 (2014),
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10824-014-9225-2.
25
The United States No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105–147
(enabling criminal prosecution of individuals who engage in copyright
infringement, effective since December 16, 1997).
26
Orme supra note 24, at 367.
27
Id. (“[I]t appears that shutting down Web sites, seemingly the most direct
method of reducing illegal access to copyrighted materials, does not have any
noticeable impact on the revenues received by the US film industry.”).
28
Sudip Bhattacharjee, Ram D. Gopal, Kaveepan Lertwachara, James R.
Marsden, & Rahul Telang, The Effect of Digital Sharing Technologies on Music
Markets: A Survival Analysis of Albums on Ranking Charts, 53 MGMT. SCI.,
1359, 1374 (2007),
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~rtelang/digital_sharing_MS.pdf.
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McKenzie and Walls indicated that several Australian court cases
significantly diminished the number of unlawful downloads of
films.29 However, these authors focused on the media coverage
devoted to cases involving copyright enforcement and effects in
reducing digital piracy, instead of the specific relationship between
the implementation of laws and the flow of illegal content online.
Specifically regarding the role of the copyright enforcement,
Varian provides a concise summary of this topic from an economic
perspective.30 Such a theoretical law and economics approach to
the relationship between digital piracy and copyright remedies—
and its legal enforcement—is also found in Margolis.31 Two pieces
of conventional wisdom within this field are that most anti-piracy
policies do not have a dramatic impact on actual downloads
because of the unenforceable nature of much of online copyright
law,32 and also that most anti-piracy strategies dilute over time
because of evolving technologies for sharing files online.33
In short, although the literature mostly agrees that legal
enforcement drives copyright infringement downward, even with
the difficulties of implementation, there is conflicting evidence
regarding the effects of copyright law on digital piracy. This article
will shed light on this issue by signaling which copyright law
measures are more highly correlated to low/high digital piracy
rates worldwide.

29

Jordi McKenzie & W. David Walls, File-Sharing and Film Revenues: An
Empirical Analysis (University of Sydney, Economics Working Paper Series,
2014),
http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au//bitstream/2123/9271/1/ECON%20201314.pdf.
30
Hal R. Varian, Copying and Copyright, 19 J. OF ECON. PERSP., 121, 138
(2005) https://www.amherst.edu/system/files/media/0657/VarianCopy.pdf.
31
STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, Law and Economics of Copyright Remedies,
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT, 241-263 (Richard Watt, ed.,
2014).
32
Brian P. Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair Use, and Willfulness-Is Congress
Making a Scarecrow of the Law?, J. OF HIGH TECH. L., 1, 27, 46 (2002),
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-172599151.html.
33
Hasshi Sudler, Effectiveness of Anti-Piracy Technology: Finding
Appropriate Solutions for Evolving Online Piracy, 56 BUS. HORIZONS, 149, 157
(2002), www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0007681312001577.
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B. Effects of Development Economics on Intellectual Property
Infringement
One of the basic ideas of this paper is that, along with or
instead of copyright law mechanisms, there may be socioeconomic
reasons (defined as control variables in the econometric
specification) that also explain digital piracy rates. General works
on development economics 34 have explored in depth the
determinants that make countries rich or poor. Associated with this
branch of knowledge, there is a growing interest in linking
economic development with digital piracy rates. For instance,
Karaganis states that “the first determinant of access to media
markets is income. [Then,] the general assumption [is] that
countries ‘grow’ themselves out of high piracy levels as the
number
of
high-income
consumers
increases
(and,
correspondingly, as formal markets crowd out informal ones).”35 In
other words, digital piracy is inversely correlated to wider
measures of socioeconomic development: the richer the country,
the lower its piracy rate. Multiple empirical research studies
support this claim.36 It is thus even clearer that such socioeconomic
indicators must be included as control variables for a dual purpose:
34

See, e.g., DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012); Jared Diamond,
What Makes Countries Rich or Poor?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
(June 7, 2012), www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/07/what-makescountries-rich-or-poor; SATYA THALLAM, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
INDEX (2008), http://www.libinst.ch/publikationen/LI-2008-IPRI-Report.pdf.
35
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES, 10 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011),
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-PDF1.0.4.pdf; see also Varian supra note 30 at 124-125.
36
Andrew E. Burke, How Effective Are International Copyright Conventions
In the Music Industry, 20 J. OF CULTURAL ECON., 51, 66 (1996),
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10824-005-1060-z; Trisha L. Bezmen
& Craig A. Depken, II, Influences On Software Piracy: Evidence From the
Various United States, 90 ECON. LETTERS, 356, 356-361 (2006),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765/90; Arnau GavaldàMiralles, et al., Impact of Heterogeneity and Socioeconomic Factors on
Individual Behavior in Decentralized Sharing Ecosystems, 111 PROC. OF THE
NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AMERICA, 15322, 15327 (2006),
http://www.pnas.org/content/111/43/15322.

OCT 2016]

Copyright Law and Digital Piracy

81

to check whether those previous findings can actually be replicated
in this study and to reduce the omitted variable bias and obtain a
cleaner legislative effect on the piracy rate. Sections III.B.1 and .3
explain in detail whether empirical results validate or refute that
development economics theory.37
C. Digital Piracy and Individual Choice
As described above, there have been very few—and narrowly
focused—studies empirically assessing the relation between
copyright law and digital piracy, and many more academic works
that have been published showing that piracy may hurt sales. The
latter area is not within the scope of this article, but the literature
states almost unanimously that copyright infringement has no
positive effects on sales (they are either neutral or negative38).39
37

Complementing the development economics literature, another one of my
key control variables targets the relationship between good, legal sources for
online content (iTunes, Netflix, Spotify) and—decreasing—piracy rates. See
Will Page, Adventures in the Netherlands: Spotify, Piracy and the New Dutch
Experience, SPOTIFY (2013),
https://press.spotify.com/us/2013/07/17/adventures-in-netherlands/ (describing
how Spotify’s launch in the Netherlands in 2010 substantially decreased
copyright infringement for music).
38
See Luis Aguiar & Bertin Martens, Digital Music Consumption on the
Internet: Evidence from Clickstream Data, Digital Economy Working Paper
2013/04 (Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Joint Research Centre
of the European Commission, Working Paper JRC79605 2013); Tin Cheuk
Leung, Music Piracy: Bad for Record Sales but Good for the iPod? (Chinese
University of Hong Kong, Working Paper 2012); Brett Danaher, Samita
Dhanasobhon, Michael D. Smith, & Rahul Telang, Converting Pirates without
Cannibalizing Purchasers: The Impact of Digital Distribution on Physical Sales
and Internet Piracy, 29 MARKETING SCI., 1138, 1149-50 (2010); Brett Danaher,
Michael D. Smith, & Rahul Telang, Piracy and Copyright Enforcement
Mechanisms (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.
19150 2013); Arthur S. DeVany & W. David Walls, Estimating the Effects of
Movie Piracy on Box-office Revenue, 30 REV. OF INDUS. ORG., 291, 299 (2007);
Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan Png, Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded
Music, 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, Art. 11, 19 (2003); Stan
J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49
J. L. & ECON., 1, 21 (2006); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High
C’s: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample
of College Students, 49 J. L. & ECON., 29, 61 (2006); Alejandro Zentner, File
Sharing and International Sales of Copyrighted Music: An Empirical Analysis
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Nevertheless, it is also true that even though the substitutability40
between a pirated and an original copy unambiguously harms the
industry, there are other considerations at stake, such as the
“sampling effect” 41 or the fact that copyright industries are
producing more content than ever before.42
In a much wider scope, which is not covered by this study,
there is extensive literature on the debate regarding copyright
regulations, piracy, and incentives toward creativity. Such general
reflections on copyright will be addressed in this article through its
three basic theoretical assumptions (discussed in Section II,
infra).43
with a Panel of Countries, 5 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, Art. 21
(2005); Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music
Purchases, 49 J. L. & ECON., 63 (2006).
39
But see Robert G. Hammond, Profit Leak? Pre-Release File Sharing and
the Music Industry, 81 S. ECON. J., 387, 389 (2014) (showing that some
individual artists may benefit from piracy); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman
Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis,
115 J. OF POL. ECON., 1, 38-40 (2007) (finding a small positive effect between
piracy and sales); and Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet
Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES, 71, 78 (2004) (suggesting antithetical evidence about the
magnitude of that causal relation).
40
In economics, when two products (such as pirated and original goods) are
substitutes, they have a positive cross elasticity of demand, which measures how
quantity demanded for a good changes with respect to variations in the price of
another good.
41
Piracy could allow a consumer to discover new songs that then induce him
or her to purchase the entire album or other songs from that artist, which
otherwise might have not been bought. See Stan J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing:
Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J OF .L. & ECON., 1, 17-18
(2006).
42
See MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, (Joe Karaganis ed. 2011),
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-PDF1.0.4.pdf; Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y. L REV.,
460, 515 (2015) http://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-90-number-2/ipworld-without-scarcity.
43
For the sake of the avid reader though, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K.
LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008); Christian Handke, Plain
Destruction or Creative Destruction? Copyright Erosion and the Evolution of
the Record Industry, 3 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES, 29-51
(2006); ROB VAN DER NOLL, ET AL., FLEXIBLE COPYRIGHT: THE LAW AND
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Finally, although it is beyond the reach of this project, for the
benefit of fullness, other interesting papers with empirical support
relate either digital piracy or sales to digital rights management
(“DRM”) technologies, 44 “poisoning” strategies, 45 digital
ECONOMICS OF INTRODUCING AN OPEN NORM IN THE NETHERLANDS (2012);
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE. PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY (Meir Perez Pugatch ed. 2006), MATTHEW RIMMER,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD
(2007) SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004),
HANDBOOK ON THE DIGITAL CREATIVE ECONOMY (Ruth Towse & Christian
Handke eds. 2013). Of course, from an American and European normative
standpoint, it is essential to cite PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT
(Aspen, New York, 3d ed. 2013); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE,
COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (7th ed. 2013);
MARTIN PEITZ AND PATRICK WAELBROECK, The Effect of Internet Piracy on
Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1-2 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT
ISSUES 71-79 (2004); EDWARD ELGAR, CHELTENHAM COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMENTARY ON EU LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (Irini A.
Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans eds. 2014); THE WITTEM PROJECT: EUROPEAN
COPYRIGHT CODE (April 2010),
http://www.copyrightcode.eu/Wittem_European_copyright_code_21%20april%
202010.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). There are also interesting papers mainly
devoted to the future of copyright; GIUSEPPINA D’AGOSTINO, COPYRIGHT,
CONTRACTS, CREATORS: NEW MEDIA, NEW RULES (2010), RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham;
Estelle Derclaye, eds. 2009), 1-6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Fiona
Macmillan ed. 2005-2007), Ian Novos & Michael Waldman, Piracy of
Intellectual Property: Past, Present, and Future, 10 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES (2013).
44
See Rajiv K. Sinha, Fenando S. Machado, & Collin Sellman, Don’t Think
Twice, It’s All Right: Music Piracy and Pricing in a DRM-Free Environment, 74
J. OF MARKETING, 40-54 (2010); Dinah A. Vernik, Devavrat Purohit, & Preyas
S. Desai, Music Downloads and the Flip Side of Digital Rights Management, 30
MARKETING SCI., 1011, 1027 (2011). DRM is a group of technologies to control
the use of digital content and devices after sale. Those authors argue that the use
of DRM may increase piracy by making the content less usable for end-users.
45
See Nicholas Christin, Andreas S. Weigend, & John Chuang, Content
Availability, Pollution, and Poisoning in File Sharing Peer-to-Peer Networks,
PROC. OF THE 6TH ACM CONF. ON ELECTRONIC COM., 68-77 (2005),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1064017. They found that file sharing
“poisoning” strategies, that is placing a few intentional decoys of pirated
content, can influence perceived availability of content in the networks.
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distribution channels, 46 pricing policies, 47 or optimal copyright
lengths.48
III. METHODOLOGY
An empirical law and economics methodology is deployed to
answer this article’s research question—that is, “which copyright
law measures are more related to low/high digital piracy rates?” It
consists of a content analysis of significantly selected copyright
law measures that have been more or less broadly implemented, or
that have been dismissed, by the current national copyright statutes
of 108 targeted countries (data from WIPO Lex). It represents a
picture of how the world of copyright is today. Considering (1) the
explanatory essence of the research question, (2) the data
collection conducted (secondary analysis of extant datasets and
content analysis of national copyright laws), (3) the number of
countries considered, and (4) the quantitative data analysis,
46

See Brett Danaher, Samita Dhanasobhon, Michael D. Smith & Rahul
Telang, Converting Pirates without Cannibalizing Purchasers: The Impact of
Digital Distribution on Physical Sales and Internet Piracy, 29 MARKETING SCI.,
1138-1151 (2010) (reviewing iTunes distribution of TV content, sales of DVD
box sets, and piracy levels); Barbara Deleersnyder, Inge Geyskens, Katrijn
Gielens & Marnik G. Dekimpe, How Cannibalistic is the Internet Channel? A
Study of the Newspaper Industry in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands,
19 INT’L J. OF RES. IN MARKETING, 337-348 (2002) (digital news and sales
physical newspapers); Yu Jeffrey Hu & Michael D. Smith, The Impact of Ebook
Distribution on Print Sales: Analysis of a Natural Experiment (Carnegie Mellon
University Working Paper 2013) (comparing sales of Kindle e-books and print
books); Joel Waldfogel, Music File Sharing and Sales Displacement in the
iTunes Era, 22 INFO. ECON. & POLICY, 306, 314 (2010) (analyzing YouTube
viewing of television content and TV viewership levels).
47
See Ramnath K. Chellappa, Yuanyuan Chen & Sriram Venkataraman, An
Empirical Examination of Global Software Piracy: Implications for Pricing and
Policy, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Yooki Park and Suzanne
Scotchmer, Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products,
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, (2005); Edward Elgar, Copying and the Pricing
of Information Goods, HANDBOOK ON THE ECON. OF COPYRIGHT, 207-224
(Richard Watt, ed. 2014).
48
See Nodir Adilov and Michael Waldman, Optimal Copyright Length and Ex
Post Investment: A Mickey Mouse Approach, 51 ECON. INQUIRY, 1101-1122
(2013); William M. Landes and Richard R. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. OF CHI. L. REV., 471-518 (2013).
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econometric modeling is the only49 suitable research strategy for
this paper.
A. Theoretical Assumptions
Three basic (and modest) theoretical assumptions drive the
whole project:
(1) Both very high and very low rates of digital piracy pose
concerns for innovation, thus implying that some level of
(effective) copyright regulation is required to incentivize the
creation of original works.
This research in no way seeks to create a regulatory copyright
model that implies a 0% piracy rate: this is neither viable nor
optimal, as trying to completely eliminate digital piracy would
require extremely aggressive copyright protection measures that
would probably reduce lawful market demand. This negative
impact on demand would lower both the equilibrium price and
quantity to suboptimal levels that would likely cause a deadweight
loss of social welfare—and, in turn, of efficiency—due to the
reduced size of the digital entertainment market.50 In other words,
understanding that the demand for digital products is relatively
elastic (i.e., there is a high substitution effect51), a minimum piracy
rate must be accepted, as this maximizes the value of the
authorized market.
(2) In comparative terms, digital piracy rates are the best
available indicator of the level of respect for copyright.
(3) Inadequate national copyright laws are linked in part to
high digital piracy rates, but there are, of course, other reasons that
may explain that level of copyright infringement, such as collective
values, business frameworks or legal enforcement. These latter
elements are included as control variables in this econometric
study.
49

There are simply no methodological alternatives that would allow such
quantitative study apart from econometric modeling.
50
See DEADWEIGHT LOSS EXAMPLE, http://goo.gl/qWCliQ (last visited Sept.
12, 2016).
51
For the music market see, e.g., Aguiar & Martens, supra note 38 at 16-17,
Deadweight Loss Example, supra note 50, Leung, supra note 38 at 28.
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B. Research Population and Sampling
The research population of this article is the World Intellectual
Property Organization’s member states—188 countries. 52 This
group was narrowed down based on available data regarding
national digital piracy from BSAs 2014 Global Software Survey.53
Thus, the convenience sample54 used equaled 108 countries.55 The
sample countries were divided into the following categories:
· Central and Eastern Europe and Central and Western Asia
(24): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,

52

See World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States,
http://www.wipo.int/members/en (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
53
BSA Global Software Survey, supra note 13.
54
This study relies on a “convenience sample” because, within the research
population, the selection of its units of analysis (108 countries) was based on a
non-random criterion, i.e., availability of national digital piracy rates.
55
The sample size is large enough to estimate the unknown parameters with
precision. The sample does not include the most part of Africa, some Asian
countries, the European microstates, the Caribbean, and the islands in the Indian
Ocean and Oceania. Taiwan is not included either because the World Bank has
no data available on the desired control variables. Hong Kong, although it is not
a member of the WIPO, is part of the sample because there are reliable data for
it. Specifically the eighty WIPO member states for which there are no data
regarding digital piracy are:
· Africa (33): Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Sao Tome
and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, and
Tanzania.
· Asia (15): Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan,
Lao, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan.
· Caribbean (15): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
· European microstates (5): Andorra, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San
Marino.
· Indian Ocean islands (4): Comoros, Madagascar, Maldives, and Seychelles.
· Oceania islands (8): Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
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Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
· Latin America (18): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
· Middle East and Africa (27): Algeria, Bahrain, Botswana,
Cameroon, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
· North America and Western Europe (22): Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
and United States.
· South and East Asia, and Pacific (17): Australia,
Bangladesh, Brunei, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.
One important warning has to be made regarding the sample.
Whereas the study’s results will obviously be applicable to the
selected countries (internal validity) because the project has been
designed to minimize systematic error, it is difficult to say that the
research will also have external validity because of the
convenience sampling. However, this is not especially troubling
because the excluded WIPO’s member states are not of central
interest in comparative legal studies regarding intellectual
property. These states include most of Africa, some Asian
countries, the European microstates, the Caribbean, and the islands
in the Indian Ocean and Oceania.
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C. Variables: Selection and Coding
1. Dependent Variable (Piracy Rates) and the BSA Global
Software Survey: Relevance, Generalization, and Limitations
The dependent variable 𝑌! (computer software piracy rate of
country i) is based on the 2014 BSA Global Software Survey.56 At
the time this article was written between 2014 and 2015, this was
the most recent and thorough comparative study on digital piracy
to date, and its outcomes continue to be applicable to 2016.57
Although the survey focuses on computer software, this type of
copyright infringement is a very good approximation of the overall
level of piracy in the country. One can assume that software piracy
rates can be suggestively extrapolated to general piracy figures
because there is association between copyright infringements for
all sorts of digital goods (software, films, music, literature, video
games):
“[G]iven the relatively uniform global pricing for most media
goods, a loose correlation is not surprising: the first determinant of
access to media markets is income. Nor is the general assumption
that countries ‘grow’ themselves out of high piracy levels as the
number
of
high-income
consumers
increases
(and,
correspondingly, as formal markets crowd out informal ones).”58

56

BSA Global Software Survey, supra note 13.
The 2014 BSA Global Software Survey was issued in June 2014 and was
based on 2013 data regarding unlicensed software installation. On May 25,
2016, the Software Alliance released the 11th edition of its survey based on
2015 data: BSA Global Software Survey 2016: Seizing Opportunity Through
License Compliance, BSA, THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE,
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2016/downloads/studies/BSA_GSS_US.pdf. Between
2013 and 2015, there has been no change or a raw decrease of 1-2% in the
software piracy rate for 91 of the 108 countries examined in this paper, with the
exceptions of Bulgaria, Poland, South Korea, and Vietnam (-3%); China, Latvia,
Moldova, and Sri Lanka (-4%); Estonia (-5%); Georgia (-6%); Bahrain,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Honduras, and Libya (+1%); and
Russia (+2%). These are all small and consistent differences across nations that
maintain the validity of the article’s results.
58
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, 10 (Joe Karaganis ed. 2011),
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-PDF1.0.4.pdf.
57
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Namely, all forms of digital piracy are, to some extent,
associated because they are inversely correlated to wider measures
of socioeconomic development—the richer the country, the lower
its piracy rate.59 For this reason, the econometric model includes
several economic control variables. Furthermore, it should be
understood that there are no databases on piracy in other sorts of
digital entertainment products that are truly comparable between
states. However, because the BSA is an organization of procopyright companies,60 it is likely to find overestimation in the
BSA study’s national digital piracy rates.61 Nevertheless, even if
bias is revealed, it does not jeopardize the validity of the work
because the absolute rate of digital piracy in one country is not
relevant here. What is essential for this comparative study is that
the BSA used the same methodology to calculate digital piracy
59

See Acemoglu and Robinson; Diamond; and Thallam, supra note 34; see
also Varian, supra note 30.
60
The Software Alliance, BSA Global & Global Policy Members,
http://www.bsa.org/about-bsa/bsa-members (last visited September 12, 2016).
Members of the Software Alliance include: Adobe, Altium, ANSYS, Apple,
Autodesk, Bentley Systems, CA Technologies, CNC Software – Mastercam,
Dell, IBM, Intel, Intuit, Microsoft, Minitab, Oracle, PTC, Rockwell Automation,
Rosetta Stone, Salesforce.com, Siemens, Symantec, Tekla, The MathWorks, and
Trend Micro.
61
See Karaganis, supra note 58 at 11, “Our reservations about measurement
extend to the BSA’s comparatively robust model of ‘rates’ of piracy, which
underpins the organization’s very precise claims about changes in levels of
piracy from one year to the next. The BSA studies rely on the relatively small
and stable (and therefore predictable) number of packaged software applications
installed on an average computer –what it calls ‘average software load’, or ASL.
ASL allows the BSA to estimate the total installed software base in a country
and to compare that number to legal sales. The difference between the two is
attributed to piracy. The model has no counterpart in music or film, where the
size of personal libraries is subject to huge and growing variation. While solid in
principle, however, the model is still very dependent on complicated inputs that
the BSA’s research vendor, the IDC [“International Data Corporation”], does
not share. Conflicting estimates of the size of retail markets, for example, are
relatively common outside the United States and Europe, as is difficulty in
establishing how many computers are in use in different countries. In the case of
Russia, for example, where the BSA prominently cites a 16% decrease in the
piracy rate between 2005 and 2009 as evidence of effective enforcement
strategies, we were unable to independently reproduce those inputs.”
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rates for all the countries, granting that the relative relations
between them remain constant.62
2. Independent Variables (Copyright Law Measures),
Replicability, and Aggregated Variable
The independent variables 𝑋 of this article’s econometric
model are copyright law measures that have been selected
according to two criteria: (1) they have the closest relationship
with immediate or proximate incentives toward digital piracy; and
(2) they have substantial variance across countries. Consider that
the relatively limited number of chosen independent variables
allow (a) increased sample size, (b) increased number of degrees of
freedom, 63 (c) gain variance, 64 and (d) limit/avoid
multicollinearity.65 Almost all copyright statutes share the same
62

The 2014 BSA study computes unlicensed software rates as the division
between unlicensed software units and total software units installed. The total
software units installed results from the multiplication of the number of PCs
getting software by the software units per PC (licensed and unlicensed). The two
sources of data that filled in the previous calculations were (1) a survey
conducted by the International Data Corporation (“IDC”)—a provider of market
statistics headquartered in Massachusetts—in early 2014 and (2) quarterly
research products called “PC Trackers” used by the IDC. The survey was
conducted online or by phone and covered (a) 22,000 home and enterprise PC
users in 34 markets and (b) 2,020 IT managers in 20 countries. IDC’s PC
Trackers reach 86 countries, and the rest of nations included in the Software
Alliance report were assessed through custom assignments. The software
examined in the BSA study comprises only PCs, including desktops, laptops,
and netbooks, but not tablets, smartphones or software that runs on servers. It
accounts for operating systems, systems software (e.g., databases and security
packages), business applications, consumer applications (e.g., games, personal
finance software, and cloud computing services), software-as-a-service (SaaS),
platform-as-a-service (“PaaS”), and software sold as part of legalization
programs (e.g., bulk sales for a government to distribute to schools), BSA
Global Software Survey, supra note 13 at 11-12.
63
In statistics, degrees of freedom are the number of independently variable
factors affecting the estimate of a statistical parameter that are free to vary.
64
In statistics, the variance (usually 𝜎 ! or Var(X)) is the expectation of the
squared standard deviation of a random variable from its mean. In other words,
it measures how far a set of numbers is with respect to its mean.
65
In statistics, multicollinearity happens when two or more independent
variables in a multiple regression are highly correlated, meaning that it is
increasingly difficult to compute the coefficient estimates of the regression or
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legal patterns or institutions including, subject matter,
authorship/ownership, terms of protection, economic and moral
rights, limitations on exclusive rights, and enforcement.66 Thus, the
selection of independent variables was made after assessing all the
common legal categories to, therefore, identify the variables that
(i) act as incentives now toward digital piracy and (ii) provide
variance. For instance, copyright terms or the possibility of
termination of transfers and licenses granted by the author67 take
place thirty or more years in the future and, hence, do not have
immediate or proximate effects on the decision of unlawfully
downloading copyrighted content today. In contrast, the exclusive
rights to reproduce copyrighted works, to prepare derivative works
or to distribute copies are very similar across countries, such that
they do not have enough variance to be included as independent
variables.
All national copyright laws can be found in English on the
WIPO Lex database. 68 This article deals only with statutes;
exclusively in some common law countries,69 court rulings were
considered but only to validate the statutory analysis—hence, court
opinions were not systematically coded. International treaties were
not added,70 although most of their content is already included in
national legislations.71
how such individual predictors affect the outcome/dependent variable. For
instance, with perfect multicollinearity, the ordinary least-squares estimator
cannot be calculated.
66
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN AND MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2012); Edwin
Komen, Theodore Max, USA Copyright 2016, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
LEGAL GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 2016),
http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/copyright/copyright-2016/usa.
67
Time limit set for the allocation of the copyright, after which it will return
to the artist. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1976).
68
World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 12.
69
This paper complements the content analysis for common law countries on
national copyright acts with court rulings: Australia, Canada, India, Ireland,
New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States.
70
The 1886 Berne Convention (Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works), the 1961 Rome Convention (Rome Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations), the 1974 Brussels Convention (Brussels Convention Relating to
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Therefore, seven binary and seven categorical variables were
selected and distributed across the following six groups:
1. Subject matter of copyright:72
1.a. Sweat of the brow doctrine 73 (Does an author gain
copyright protection through simple diligence, effort, and expense
during the creation of a work, such as a database, or a directory? In
such case, it means that substantial creativity or “originality” is not
required.) (binary).74 [“sweatbrow”]75

the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite), the
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, other WIPO-administered treaties, the 1952 UNESCO Universal
Copyright Convention, and the 1994 TRIPS Agreements, among others.
71
See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (1986), World Intellectual Property Organization (setting only minimum
standards for the signatory parties).
72
Generally, the subject matter of copyright refers to the types of works that
are protected by copyright laws, such as literary, musical, dramatic,
choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, audiovisual, and architectural
works. In the United States, it covers “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.” Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2012). Moreover, “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2012).
73
In the United States, the sweat of the brow doctrine was once understood
for the proposition “that an original arrangement of opinions is copyrightable
whenever it is the product of labor, talent, or judgment.” West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1070 (1987) (citing Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 32 L.Ed. 547, 9 S.Ct. 177
(1888). Contra Feist Pub’l, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 US 340 (1991)
(establishing that information alone without a minimum of original creativity
may not be protected by copyright, and thus rejecting the application of the
sweat of the brow doctrine to U.S. copyright law).
74
Binary variables are computed as 0 or 1. For more details, refer to coding
outcomes provided in Appendix.
75
The descriptors in brackets define the independent and control variables
shown in the tables and figures below.
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1.b. Is computer software considered a literary work?
(binary).76 [“softlitwork”]
2. Authorship and ownership:77
2.a. Work-for-hire provisions (binary).78 [“workforhire”]
2.b. Provision of solutions to copyright clarification problems
in collective and orphan works (structural market failure),79 such as
one-stop shops and voluntary public registers (binary). 80
[“collorphanworks”]
76

See generally WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 4, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-17. (“Computer programs are protected as literary works within
the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention.”). See also Andy Ramos,
Laura López, Anxo Rodríguez, Tim Meng, & Stan Abrams, The Legal Status of
Video Games: Comparative Analysis in National Approaches, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (2013),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/activities/pdf/comparative_
analysis_on_video_games.pdf, (comparing legal and copyright status of video
games among countries).
77
In the United States, ownership of copyright protected by the U.S.
Copyright Act “vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors
of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)
(2012).
78
See generally CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE
FREE: LAWS FOR THE INTERNET AGE, (2014) (discussing the tensions between
copyright laws in the digital age and small artists’ ability to earn money from
their works).
79
”An ‘orphan work’ [is] any original work of authorship for which a good
faith prospective user cannot readily identify and/or locate the copyright
owner(s) in a situation where permission from the copyright owner(s) is
necessary as a matter of law.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN
WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION (2015) at 9,
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf.
80
See generally Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and the
Council of 25 Oct. 12 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, O. J. (L
299),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0028&from=EN
(showing
the
European Union Directive’s approach allowed uses of orphaned works); Final
Guidelines on Copyright Clearance and IPR Management, Art. 2.2, EUROPEAN
FILM GATEWAY ECP-2007-DILI-517006 (2010),
http://www.efgproject.eu/downloads/D_5_3_Final_Guidelines_Copyright_Clear
ance_online.pdf (defining and discussing proper use and attribution of orphan
works); Directive of the European Parliament of 24 May 2011 on certain
permitted uses of orphan works (COM [2011] 289 final),
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3. Exclusive rights:81
3.a. Scope of performance and display rights (whether they
encompass digital technology, which is very relevant in a world
dominated by streaming and cloud services) (discrete
categorization 0-3). [“performdisplay”]
3.b. Secondary liability for Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
and safe harbors (discrete categorization 0-3).82 [“secliabilityisp”]
3.c. Scope of moral rights (discrete categorization 0-3).
[“moralrights”]
4. Rights management:
4.a. Provisions
on
compulsory
licenses
(binary).
[“compulsorylicenses”]
4.b. Regulation and powers of copyright collecting agencies
(collective
licensing)
(discrete categorization 0-3). 83
[“collectingagencies”]
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/businesses/intellectual_
property/mi0084_en.htm (proposing new uses of orphaned works).
81
In the United States, and subject to certain limitations, the owner of
copyright has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize the reproduction and
distribution of the copyrighted work, the preparation of derivative works and, if
applicable, the public performance and display of the copyrighted work. 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2) (2010).
82
In the United States, the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act added
§ 512 to the 1976 Copyright Act to provide substantial immunity from copyright
liability to ISPs if they are within one of these five safe harbors: (1) transitory
digital network communications, (2) system caching, (3) information storage,
(4) information location tools, and (5) service provision by nonprofit educational
institutions. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-81 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
Consider that this article uses the broad definition of Internet Service Provider or
Internet intermediary, which includes the typical ISP companies (like AT&T),
but also cable companies, Internet portals (eBay, Facebook), software and
games providers, interactive forums, news aggregators, web search engines, and
chats rooms. Of course, this accounts as well for (a) direct download websites
(MEGA, RapidShare) and streaming websites (Dailymotion, Vimeo, YouTube),
(b) peer-to-peer exchange programs (MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005), µTorrent, eMule), and (c) websites with magnet links (The
Pirate Bay, (https://thepiratebay.org/) and embedded videos.
83
See, e.g., INT’ CONFED OF AUTHORS & COMPOSERS (CISAC),
http://www.cisac.org/What-We-Do (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
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5. Limitations on exclusive rights:84
5.a. Possibility of private copying (and existence of private
copying levy) (discrete categorization 0-3). [“private copying”]
5.b. Provisions on the fair use doctrine, the fair dealing
doctrine, and similar concepts (discrete categorization 0-3). 85
[“fairuse”]
5.c. Provisions on the first sale doctrine or exhaustion of rights
(binary).86 [“firstsale”]
6. Remedies87 and public domain88:
84

The U.S. Copyright Act provides a number of limitations on exclusive
rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010) (fair use); id. § 108 (reproductions by
libraries and archives); id. § 109 (transfer by the owner of a particular copy); id.
§ 110 (some performances and display for education or religious purposes); id.
§ 111 (some cable broadcast transmissions); id. § 112 (ephemeral recordings
made and retained by broadcasters); id. § 117 (additional copy or adaptation by
the owner of a copy of a computer program as an essential step in its utilization,
for archival purposes or for machine maintenance and repair); id. § 119 (some
secondary transmissions of distant television programming by satellite); id.
§ 121 (reproduction and distribution of copies or phonorecords of previously
published, nondramatic literary work for blind or other people with disabilities);
id. § 122 (some secondary transmissions of local television programming by
satellite).
85
The fair use doctrine exempts from copyright infringement liability the
reproduction or other usage of copyrighted material “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010).
86
”Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 (3) [distribution right], the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord.” 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a) (2010). This limitation on the copyright
holders’ exclusive right of distribution is known as the first sale doctrine—or
exhaustion of rights principle in Europe—and it allows the owner of a physical
copy of a work to legally resell it without obtaining permission of the copyright
owner.
87
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-513 (2010) (setting out scheme for
copyright infringement remedies).
88
In copyright, works in the public domain are those whose exclusive rights
have expired, have been forfeited or are inapplicable. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE,
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (Yale University
Press, New Haven) (2008), http://thepublicdomain.org/thepublicdomain1.pdf.
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6.a. Remedies for copyright infringement, including civil,
criminal, and administrative consequences (discrete categorization
0-3). [“remedies”]
6.b. Legal forecast of copyleft89 schemes (the voluntary public
domain is a possibility within the scope of Creative Commons and
the GNU General Public License) (binary). [“copyleft”]
The previous legislative measures (qualitative in nature), which
act as independent variables, were formalized—i.e., coded as
quantitative data—to meet the requirements of any econometric
model.90 Bear in mind that the categorization of variables, as is
unavoidable in economics and econometrics, is a simplification of
the reality: the study loses qualitative detail to gain statistical
evidence, which is a trade-off that must be accepted. Although
binary variables are easy to code, independent variables based on
the 0-3 discrete categorization are trickier. The rule of thumb
behind it91 is that 0 indicates that there is no provision with respect
to that copyright law measure, and 1, 2, and 3 mean that a country
has such a provision with a small, medium or large scope,
respectively. For instance, in the variable “remedies for copyright
infringement” (6.a), 0 means no legal consequences for violating
copyright, (1) lenient consequences, (2) neither lenient nor harsh
consequences, and (3) harsh consequences.
The coding scheme developed for this paper achieved a high
degree of replicability, which is essential to increase the reliability
of its conclusions. It was shared with a Professor of Copyright Law
at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, and with a J.D. student at
Stanford Law School. They were asked to code both the U.S. and
89

“Copyleft is a general method for making a [work] free, and requiring all
modified and extended versions of the [work] to be free as well.” GNU
Operating System, WHAT IS COPYLEFT?, https://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2016).
90
Natural language cannot be indeed processed through econometric tools
and, therefore, the selected national legislative measures were quantitatively
coded.
91
For the categorization of all independent variables, objective standards used
were taken from secondary authorities, see GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 43 at 1:2-26, Sherrell, supra note 16, Ulmer and Schricker, supra note 16 at
chapters 3 and 5.
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the Spanish Copyright Act according to the protocol, with the
following results:
TABLE 1. REPLICABILITY TEST RESULTS
U.S. Copyright Act

Spanish Copyright Act

Professor of
Copyright Law
at Universitat
Pompeu Fabra

100% in binary variables (7/7)
86% in categorical variables (6/7)

100% in binary variables (7/7)
100% in categorical variables (7/7)

J.D. student at
Stanford Law
School

100% in binary variables (7/7)
86% in categorical variables (6/7)

100% in binary variables (7/7)
86% in categorical variables (6/7)

Thus, although quite accurate, the coding scheme obviously
still has room for improvement, especially regarding categorical
variables. Thus, the coding outcomes are already publicly available
(see Appendix) to refine them following a process of online
crowdsourcing.
At the end of the coding process, an aggregated independent
variable [“aggregated”] was also generated for each national
copyright statute, which accounts for its global level of copyright
optimism/pessimism92 or, in other words, whether that act is more
pro-copyright holder or rather more pro-consumer/pro-free access.
This provides the big picture of each copyright statute. The
formula for computing such an aggregated figure consists in a
weighted mean of all independent variables (subtracting half of
their value to the categorical ones to equal them to the binary
92

See generally Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 10–16 (2003) (describing the copyright debate
between people who “view copyright’s cup of entitlement as always half full,
only waiting to be filled still further [optimists]” and people who “see
copyright’s cup as half empty: they accept that copyright owners should get
some measure of control over copies as an incentive to produce creative works,
but they would like copyright to extend only as far as is necessary to give this
incentive, and treat anything more as an encroachment on the general freedom
of everyone to write and say what they please [pessimists].”), id. at 11.
TO THE
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measures) and applying + or – to each variable depending,
respectively, on whether it aims to increase authors’ protection or
to give more freedom to consumers (see Appendix for more
details). Finally, the results are converted to their absolute values
and logarithmically normalized: a result closer to 1 means that, in
general, the copyright statute is more pro-copyright holder,
whereas numbers near 0 imply more pro-consumer regulations in
that country.
3. Control Variables
Other important factors that may affect digital piracy were
included as controls W in this econometric model to obtain a more
exact relationship of legal measures on piracy rate in order to
reduce any bias due to omitted variables. Control variables
included:93
1. Economics:
1.a. GDP per capita (current US$). [“gdpcapita”]
1.b. Gini index.94 [“gini”]
1.c. Unemployment (% of total labor force) (modeled
International Labor Organization estimate). [“unemployment”]
2. Technology:
2.a. Internet users (per 100 people). [“internetusers”]
2.b. Annual per capita spending on legitimate digital goods.* 95
[“spendinglegitdiggoods”]
93

WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, http://data.worldbank.org (last visited Sept. 12,
2016). All data for this section are from the World Bank, except for those
variables marked with “*”. Note that, although these variables are used as
controls because of the nature of my research question, econometrics also allows
the treatment of them as independent variables. This is especially important for
controls such as the ones related to GDP, business models, sociocultural values,
and judicial enforcement.
94
The Gini index or coefficient represents the income distribution of a
nation’s residents and is the most commonly used measure of inequality. “[A]
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect
inequality.” GINI Index (World Bank Estimate), THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2013&start=2013&view
=map&year=2013 (Click “Details” on interactive chart for definition) (last
visited Sept. 12, 2016).
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2.c. Presence of business models adapted to the “digital
economy” 96 (Spotify Premium, Netflix, and iTunes).* 97
[“businessmodels”]
2.d. Research and development expenditure (% of GDP).
[“researchdevexp”]
3. Others (geography, demographics, social attitudes, and
legal system):
3.a. Region
3.b. Adult literacy rate (% of people aged 15 and above).
[“adultliteracy”]
3.c. Population aged 65 and above (%).98 [“oldpopulation”]

95

This variable is generated from the national “Commercial Value of Properly
Licensed Software 2011” of the BSA’s Global Software Piracy Study, published
in BSA, THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (2013), Competitive Advantage: The
Economic Impact of Properly Licensed Software, 10–14,
http://portal.bsa.org/insead/assets/studies/2013softwarevaluestudy_en.pdf.
96
See DON TAPSCOTT , THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: PROMISE AND PERIL IN THE
AGE OF NETWORKED INTELLIGENCE (1997).
97
See Sophie Curtis, Spotify and Netflix Curb Music and Film Piracy,
TELEGRAPH (July 18, 2013, 9:57 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10187400/Spotify-and-Netflixcurb-music-and-film-piracy.html (demonstrating that piracy rates decrease as
good, legal sources for online content increase); Stuart Dredge, Is Streaming
Music Cannibalising Piracy? Spotify Dutch Study Says ‘Ja’, MUSIC ALLY (July
17, 2013), http://musically.com/2013/07/17/is-streaming-cannibalising-piracyspotify-dutch-study-says-ja; Will Page, ADVENTURES IN THE NETHERLANDS:
SPOTIFY, PIRACY AND THE NEW DUTCH EXPERIENCE 1 (2013),
https://spotify.box.com/shared/static/nbktls3leeb0rcyh41sr.pdf; Glyn Moody,
Yet More Evidence That Offering Good Legal Alternatives Reduces Music
Piracy, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 10, 2014, 12:25 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140910/09064428480/yet-more-evidencethat-offering-good-legal-alternatives-reduces-music-piracy.shtml;
Matt
Schruers, Variety Covers Internet Disintermediation; Producer Says ‘Get Off
My Lawn’, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/080514-variety-coversdisintermediation-producer-says-get-off-my-lawn. See also INTERNET POLICY
TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 77-78 (July 2013),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper
.pdf.
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3.d. Pro-copyright social norms.*99 [“procopsocialnorms”]
3.e. Presence of the Pirate Party (binary).* [“pirateparty”]
3.f. Level
of
judicial
enforcement
for
copyright
100
infringement.* [“enforcement”]
98

This variable is included to account for the fact that an older population
affects—by decreasing—the digital piracy rate. See infra note 107.
99
The best available proxies to account for pro-copyright social norms are
related to indices on ethics, corruption, and crime. Thus, this variable was
created using the mean of the following concepts: (a) the six dimensions of
national culture by GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING
VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS
(2d. 2001); GEERT HOFSTEDE, GERT JAN HOFSTEDE & MICHAEL MINKOV,
CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (3d. 2010); see also
Bryan W. Husted, The Impact of National Culture on Software Piracy, 26 J. OF
BUS. ETHICS, 197, 201 (2000) (explaining certain cultural values (“power
distance,” “individualism versus collectivism,” masculinity versus femininity,”
“uncertainty avoidance,” “pragmatic versus normative”—formerly known as
“long-term orientation versus short-term normative orientation”—, and
“indulgence versus restrain” may affect software piracy)); (b) “Ethics and
corruption” see Klaus Schwab, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM Global
Competitiveness
Report
2014–2015,
http://reports.weforum.org/globalcompetitiveness-report-2014-2015); (c) “Freedom from Corruption” see TERRY
MILLER ET AL., HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2014 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 49 (2014), http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/book/index_2014.pdf; and (d)
“Absence of Corruption” and “Absence of Crime” see World Justice Project
Rule of Law Index, 179, 182 (2014),
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_20
14_report.pdf.
100
This variable is included to capture the idea that “the same law” can be
applied very differently depending on its enforcement. The degree to which a
law is enforced directly affects the cost-benefit analysis for individuals: a low
degree of enforcement decreased the probability of being punished, which
means less cost for the individual and more unlawful conduct. The factor used
here is a mean mix of four variables from three different international studies.
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2014–2015
407 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2014),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_201415.pdf (“1.02 Intellectual property protection”); TERRY MILLER, ET AL., THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2014 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 471–72 (The
Heritage Foundation ed., 2013),
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/book/index_2014.pdf
(“Property Rights”); THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2014
165–166 (The World Justice Project ed., 2014),
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics analysis is not a key component of
this paper because it only provides a few broad brushstrokes of
what this study actually covers. However, some results deserve
attention (the full table is in the Appendix, with emphasis on the
most relevant data points).
First, the average digital piracy rate worldwide is 58.36%,
which is not nuanced enough, especially if we consider the
likelihood of overestimation in the BSA’s study. This concern will
be overcome in the next section on multivariate analysis.
Of the sample countries, 76% consider software a literary
work. This high figure is likely due to the Berne Convention,
which was designed to better protect authors. 75% of the sampled
countries apply the first sale doctrine, a pro-consumer measure,
which allows second-hand markets for physical goods.
Moreover, the scope of the performance and display rights, the
moral rights, and the copyright remedies are very high. All three
are essential to provide more protection to copyright holders. It is
thus a way to see how, in general, copyright statutes are highly
influenced by lobbies from the entertainment industry.
Finally, some demographic data: 56% of the individuals in the
sample countries have Internet access. Moreover each individual
spends $28.45/year on legal purchases of digital goods. We also
observe neither high nor low values for business models, procopyright social norms, enforcement for IP infringement, and
presence of the Pirate Party. The relevance of these variables will
be better framed in the following pages.
B. Multivariate Analysis
As the research question shows, this study exclusively accounts
for correlations between copyright law measures—as well as
control variables—and digital piracy rates; it does not try to assess
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_20
14_report.pdf (“6.1. Effective regulatory enforcement” and “7.6 Effective civil
justice enforcement”).
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causal effects because, under its current approach, it would
encounter the so-called identification problem.101
Before getting into the findings, it is important to understand
that there are two competing models regarding piracy and
copyright regulations. The first one supports an inverse
relationship between them (i.e., more copyright protection, less
piracy—or equally, less copyright protection, more piracy). The
second one defends a direct relationship between those two
variables (i.e., less copyright protection, less piracy—or equally,
more copyright protection, more piracy). When referring to
“intuitive” results below (that is, the expected behavior of the
variables), it is under the assumption defended by the direct
relationship model.
1. Correlation Analysis
To know what copyright law measures and/or control variables
are more related to high/low digital piracy rates, correlation
analyses were conducted:

101

The identification problem consists of not being able to say what reduced
form coefficients of a model are compatible with each specific structural
coefficients. For example, we cannot know whether a low/high digital piracy
rate would be caused by a more/less expansive fair use doctrine, and/or more
lenient/harsher provisions on remedies for copyright infringement, and/or the
legal forecast of copyleft schemes. To solve the identification issue, the
methodology used in this article would need to be changed and, for instance,
adopt a quasi-experimental perspective. However, the global cross-national
purpose of this study is not suitable for a quasi-experimental strategy, though
future versions of this paper will likely incorporate this approach. Further
developments of this study may also encompass panel data to assess causal
relationships. Thus, the author may combine the cross-sectional data of this
paper (current situation of 108 jurisdictions) with time series data, that is
analyzing digital piracy rates, legislative changes, and control variables for the
last X years in all the sample countries.
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TABLE 2. CORRELATION ANALYSIS102

Looking first at the correlations between the digital piracy rate
and independent variables, at least three key results arise:
(1) As intuitively expected, the presence of the sweat of the
brow doctrine and a larger scope of secondary liability rules for
ISPs are related to high levels of piracy.
Regarding the sweat of the brow, when an author gains rights
through simple diligence during the creation of a work (thus,
substantial creativity or “originality” is not required), more (not
very sensitive) material (databases, directories) becomes
copyrighted and hence incentives to infringe increase. In this
regard, remember Justice O’Connor’s excerpt from the Feist case
quoted in the introduction. This fundamental opinion in the U.S.
copyright history rejected the sweat of the brow doctrine, which
102

Table 2 shows the correlation between independent/control variables and
digital piracy rates, considering all 108 jurisdictions in the sample. When the
result is positive (dark blue bar), that variable and digital piracy react in the
same way (e.g., more expansive rules on secondary liability for ISPs relates to
higher piracy rates). In turn, when the result is negative (red bar), that variable
and digital piracy are inversely associated (e.g., broader rules on fair use are
correlated with lower piracy rates). For negative correlation results, Table 2
includes red, yellow, and green dots to ease visual perception of relatively low,
medium, and high inverse associations. The colored variable names in bold
reflect results further explained below.
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had been upheld several times until then, thus making the U.S.
Copyright Act more balanced between authors and consumers.
The rationale with respect to secondary liability for ISPs is that
if copyright holders can request ISPs to take down content that
presumably is infringing their copyright, then less material can be
freely accessed by consumers on YouTube, Vimeo, Facebook, or
Google. Thus, piracy tends to be higher because users get access to
such content by illegal means (e.g., The Pirate Bay103).
(2) Again, it is intuitive that copyright law measures such as
private copying regulations and the fair use doctrine are correlated
to low digital piracy rates. On the one hand, if consumers are
allowed to make private copies of copyrighted works for their
personal uses (and thus do not need to purchase another original
copy), piracy should be reduced. On the other hand, if users have
more exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights that copyright
holders own (the fair use doctrine), there is more room for free
access, and thus less piracy. Some common examples of fair use
are commentary, search engines, criticism, parody, news reporting,
research, teaching, library archiving, and scholarship.
(3) The last—and perhaps most crucial—result of this
correlation analysis explains that a more pro-copyright holder
statute is related to higher piracy rates and vice versa (statutes that
are more pro-consumer are connected to a lower piracy rate in that
country).
Other copyright laws also correlate to low digital piracy rates.
Some of them (a) provision of solutions to copyright clarification
problems in collective and orphan works; (b) provisions on
compulsory licenses; (c) provisions on the first sale doctrine or
exhaustion of rights; and (d) legal forecast of copyleft schemes) are
tied to lower levels of piracy, as was intuitively foreseen because
they are pro-consumer-oriented variables. However, the analysis
also shows some counterintuitive results—in terms of the direct
relationship model—because a group of copyright measures that
give more protection to authors are, at the same time, correlated to
103

THE PIRATE BAY, https://thepiratebay.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2016)
(facilitating primary illegal downloads through peer-to-peer file sharing
technology, specifically the BitTorrent protocol).
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lower rates of digital piracy. They are (a) whether computer
software is considered as a literary work, (b) work-for-hire
provisions, (c) scope of performance and display rights, (d) scope
of moral rights, (e) regulation and powers of copyright collecting
agencies, and (f) remedies for copyright infringement, including
civil, criminal, and administrative consequences. This issue
requires further empirical research to better understand the
interaction between those variables and digital piracy rates.
Second, correlations between digital piracy rates and the
control variables were analyzed. Three fields are especially
relevant in this sense:
(1) As predicted by the development economics theory, this
study empirically shows that (a) the richer the country (in terms of
GDP per capita), the lower its piracy rate; and (b) societies with
more income inequality (higher values of the Gini index)
experience higher levels of digital piracy.
(2) The existence of a legitimate market for intellectual
property goods (“businessmodels”) is connected to less piracy, but
not as much as expected.104 This may be explained because the
only input analyzed was comparable information for the national
presence/availability of Spotify, Netflix, and iTunes, and not data
showing their actual use in that country. Thus, although this
research is in line with the extant literature focusing on specific
jurisdictions that shows that the greater the use of such business
models, the less the digital piracy, a stronger correlation could not
be found due to such methodological limitation.
(3) As predicted, when a country has higher standards of procopyright social norms and better enforcement for IP infringement,
piracy rates go down.
Third, in addition to the Gini index, the only control variable
that relates to higher digital piracy is unemployment. This means
that a society with more unemployed people is correlated with
higher piracy rates. However, this association is very weak.105 The
rest of control variables are connected to low piracy rates. All the
104

See Page, supra note 37.
The correlation coefficient between unemployment and digital piracy rate
is only 0.0878.
105
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foreseeable results ((a) annual per capita spending on legitimate
digital goods; (b) research and development expenditure; and (c)
adult literacy rate) imply that better socioeconomic indicators
mean less digital piracy, as mentioned before when assessing the
development economics theory. Moreover, as it is intuitive as well,
when the percentage of a country’s population aged sixty-five and
above is high, there is less digital piracy.106 Results also show that
both the percentage of Internet users in a given jurisdiction and the
presence of the Pirate Party are related to lower levels of digital
piracy. This suggests that societies with more Internet users and
the Pirate Party as an option for the ballot box are more aware of
copyright and thus engage less in piracy. Alternatively, this
correlation may be explained by economics as these two variables
are related to economic development, which is associated with
lower rates of digital piracy.

106

The fact that elderly people’s Internet use is lower compared to that of
younger segments of the population, and they also show inferior levels of digital
literacy, may account for a lower digital piracy rate compared to nations with
younger citizens. See Aaron Smith, OLDER ADULTS AND TECHNOLOGY USE
(Pew Research Center 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/03/olderadults-and-technology-use/; see also Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan,
AMERICAN’S INTERNET ACCESS: 2000–2015 4 (Pew Research Center, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/06/2015-06-26_internet-usage-acrossdemographics-discover_FINAL.pdf.
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2. Regression Analysis107
Using digital piracy rates as Y, the aggregated variable as X,
and controlling for the W variables, regression analyses were
employed to get a rough estimate of the effect of piracy on the
aggregated independent variable. The scatterplot below is a simple
regression (just the dependent and independent variables) but,
nevertheless, supports the argument. It shows a relatively steep
slope, which means that statutes that are more pro-copyright holder
(and thus less pro-consumer or less pro-free access) are associated
with higher digital piracy rates:
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FIGURE 1. REGRESSION ANALYSIS (I)
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aggregated
Fitted values
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dpiracy

However, as one can observe in the graph, the dispersion of the
data points with respect to the regression line is notable. Adding
control variables will improve these results as represented in the
following regression table:
107

For a discussion of control variables, see supra Section III.B.1.
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TABLE 3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS (II)
dpiracy (Y)

(1) OLS

(2) GLM

aggregated (X)

11.67**
(4.62)

gdpcapita (W1)

-0.0002*
(0.0001)

Virtually same results
but the coefficient of
“aggregated” is here
statistically
significant at 99%
confidence.

gini (W2)

-0.025
(0.11)

unemployment (W3)

-0.13
(0.15)

internetusers (W4)
spendinglegitdiggoods (W5)

-0.29***
(0.06)
0.038
(0.04)

businessmodels (W6)

-1.66**
(0.95)

researchdevexp (W7)

-3.66***
(1.19)

adultliteracy (W8)

0.15**
(0.089)

oldpopulation (W9)

0.045
(0.20)

procopsocialnorms (W10)

6.5***
(1.66)

pirateparty (W11)

-6.75***
(2.10)

enforcement (W12)

-13.56***
(1.94)

* significant at 90% confidence; ** significant at 95% confidence;
*** significant at 99% confidence | N = 108

Both econometric specifications (Ordinary Least Squares
[“OLS”] and Generalized Linear Model [“GLM”]) provide almost
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the same regression coefficients, showing that the results are
robust. The interpretation of this multiple regression is clear: a
positive and large coefficient (𝛽! =+11.67) that is statistically
significant at 95% confidence (or p-value ≤ 0.05) under the OLS
model. Thus, statutes that are more pro-copyright holder are
associated with higher digital piracy rates whereas more proconsumer regulations are connected to lower levels of piracy. This
result is consistent with the negative or inverse correlation found
earlier between piracy rates and the aggregated variable.108
C. Main Contributions and Policy Recommendations
The main results of this multivariate assessment, for both the
correlation and the regression analyses, can be easily summarized.
This is the first comprehensive cross-national quantitative study on
comparative copyright law that:
(1) Identifies the legal measures that are more correlated to
high digital piracy rates: sweat of the brow and secondary liability
for ISPs.
(2) Identifies the legal measures that are more correlated to low
digital piracy rates: private copying and fair use.
(3) Proves with statistical significance that statutes that are
more pro-copyright holder are associated with higher rates of
digital piracy (and vice versa).
(4) Validates the development economics literature: the richer
the country, the lower its piracy rate.
These outcomes have quite a straightforward implication for
legislatures when designing copyright regulations, although it may
upset some sectors of the entertainment industry. To fight digital
piracy, aside from improving social attitudes, economic indicators,
judicial enforcement, and legal markets for intellectual property
products, the trend should be to avoid amendments that increase
the protection toward copyright holders (e.g., secondary liability
rules for ISPs). Rather, those legal reforms should follow a
relatively pro-consumer or pro-free access nature, i.e., fostering
provisions on private copying or fair use.
108

See supra Table 2.
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D. Application of the Proposed Policy Guidelines to the United
States and Spain
The previous policy suggestions will be applied to the specific
cases of the United States and Spain to test their reliability. These
two countries were selected because they are both developed
nations but show very different levels of digital piracy. Hence,
provided that the U.S. and the Spanish piracy rates are,
respectively, very low (18%) and very high (45%), this application
is expected to find a fair degree of overlap between this article’s
proposal and the current legal and economic copyright situation in
the United States, whereas much more divergences are likely to be
present in the Spanish framework.
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TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED POLICY
GUIDELINES WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION OF
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN
Relationship
to Digital
Piracy109

Ideal
Trend/Scope
to Reduce
Piracy110

éé
êê
ê
êê
êê
éé
ê
êê
êê
êêê
êêê
êê
êê
ê

îî
ì
ì
ì
ì
îî
ì
ì
ì
ìì
ìì
ì
ì
ì

éé

îî

0.18 ✔

0.65 ✖

gdpcapita
businessmodels
procopsocialnorms

êêê
êê
êêê

ìì
ì
ìì

53,042 ✔
3 ✔
4.32 ✓

29,863.2 ✗
2 ✓
3.14 ✖

enforcement

êêê

ìì

5.41 ✔

3.58 ✗

15.5/19=82%

10/19=53%

dpiracy
sweatbrow
softlitwork
workforhire
collorphanworks
performdisplay
secliabilityisp
moralrights
compulsorylicenses
collectingagencies
privatecopying
fairuse
firstsale
remedies
copyleft
aggregated

RESULTS
109

United
States
(Current
Situation111)

Spain
(Current
Situation111)

18%

45%

0
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
2
3
1
3
0

0
1
0
0
3
3
3
1
3
2
3
1
3
0

✔
✔
✔
✔
✓
✔
✖
✔
✔
✓
✔
✔
✔
✖

✔
✔
✖
✖
✔
✖
✔
✔
✔
✓
✔
✔
✔
✖

See supra Section III.B.1 (providing a description of this data, which come
from the correlation analysis).
110
When the copyright law measure or control variable is correlated to higher
digital piracy rates, the policy suggestion is to reduce its scope. In contrast,
when copyright regulations or control variables are connected to lower digital
piracy rates, then legislatures should tend to expand the extent or range of these
copyright legal provisions.
111
Data from coding outcomes spreadsheet (see infra Table 6).
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With respect to the ideal panorama—according to the results of
this article—aiming to combat piracy in the copyright field, the
current situation in the United States achieves 82% overlap,
whereas the one in Spain only reaches 53%. These outcomes
support the practical reliability of these findings and policy
recommendations because there is a clear connection between
them and actual digital piracy rates, at least for the United States
and Spain.
Thus, although the United States seems to have understood the
equitable compromise between authors and consumers required to
incentivize creativity, innovation, and originality, Spain does not
and still has a serious problem with digital piracy. The country’s
rate of computer software copyright infringement is 45%, well
above the European standard of 22-25%.112 In music, movies, video
games, and literature the piracy rate reaches an extremely high
84%. 113 It gives the impression, then, that the current Spanish
law—Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996 of April 12, which
approves the Consolidated text of the Law on Intellectual Property
(LPI)114—has been unable to successfully react to many of the
112

See BSA Global Software Survey, supra note 13, BSA, THE SOFTWARE
ALLIANCE, Competitive Advantage: The Economic Impact of Properly Licensed
Software (2013),
http://portal.bsa.org/insead/assets/studies/2013softwarevaluestudy_en.pdf.
Rate of computer software piracy (45%) = market value of pirated content /
value of the legal and illegal industry, i.e.: $1,044M / $2,320M. Comparative
data: countries in Central and Northern Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United
Kingdom) have software piracy rates between 22 and 25%. The situation is even
better in the United States (18%) and Japan (19%). Within the Spanish
geopolitical environment, the alarming piracy rate (45%) is only comparable to
that in France (36%), Italy (47%), and Portugal (40%).
113
GfK, Observatorio de Piratería y Hábitos de Consumo de Contenidos
Digitales 2013 [Observatory of Piracy and Consumption Habits of Digital
Content]
(2014),
http://www.cedro.org/docs/default-source/textos-deinter%C3%A9s/observatorio-pirateria2013.pdf. Digital piracy rate in music,
movies, video games, and literature (84%) = market value of pirated content /
value of the legal and illegal industry, i.e.: €16,136M / €19,210M.
114
The LPI experienced its two most significant amendments with Law
23/2006 of July 7 and Law 21/2014 of November 4. This latter reform—in force
since January 1, 2015—introduces some important changes to the Spanish
Copyright Act: (1) harsher fines for copyright infringement; (2) easier
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issues raised in the copyright field. Moreover, the importance of
having a better Copyright Act is not negligible at all: Spain would
be able to capture some of the loss of profits generated by digital
piracy, valued at over 1.3 billion Euros per year and 26,600 jobs.
The translation of these figures into relative terms is
overwhelming: the Spanish entertainment industry (music, movies,
video games, and literature) could potentially increase its annual
turnover by 43% and increase job creation in the sector by 42%.115
In a broader, comparative framework, it is also obvious that the
proper treatment of copyright must become a legal policy priority
issue, including taking an economic perspective. The “cultural and
creative industries” (“CCI”) accounted for 2.6% of the European
Union’s GDP in 2010, which was significantly higher than
industries such as real estate, agribusiness, chemical, or
information and communications technologies, and it provided
employment to approximately five million people within the EU.116
In the United States, the CCIs, known as “core copyright

procedures for the government to shut down websites that engage in digital
piracy; (3) implementation of the “Google tax” (economic compensation for
news editors and publishers when news aggregators websites use their contents,
which caused Google News closure in Spain last December); (4) economic
compensation for private copying—whose scope has been reduced—now paid
to copyright holders through the Spanish public treasury, instead of being
directly charged to consumers when they buy some technological products; (5)
attempt to increase the transparency and efficiency of the copyright collecting
agencies; and (6) more protection to copyright owners (20 years of additional
protection for artists, performers, and producers of phonograms, more coverage
for orphan works, and stricter limits in the use of copyrighted works for
educational and research purposes). Nonetheless, I will not code this last
amendment in the Spanish Copyright Act since its effects on digital piracy are
still unclear (recall that it entered into force on January 1, 2015).
115
See GfK, supra note 113. Loss of profits (€1,326M) = market value of
pirated content multiplied by the average conversion rate of the pirated product
to the legally acquired product, i.e.: €16,136M * 8.02%. In 2013 the turnover of
the Spanish music, movie, video game, and literature industries totaled €3,096M
and 63,578 direct jobs.
116
European Commission, Green Paper: Unlocking the Potential of Cultural
and Creative Industries 2–3 (April 27, 2010),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0183&from=EN.
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industries,” represented 6.4% of its GDP in the same year and
accounted for 3.9% of its employment.117
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article aims to identify which copyright law measures are
more related to low/high digital piracy rates. The analysis relied
primarily on data from WIPO Lex, the BSA, and the World Bank
and provides a picture of how the copyright universe is today. The
deployed empirical law and economics methodology consisted of a
content analysis of significantly selected copyright law measures
that have been more or less broadly implemented, or that have
been dismissed, by 108 countries in their current national copyright
statutes. The resultant coding scheme achieved a high degree of
replicability, which is essential to increase the accuracy of its
conclusions.
After processing the database with econometric tools, the
findings suggest that (1) the legal measures that are more
correlated to high digital piracy rates are the sweat of the brow
doctrine and secondary liability rules for ISPs; (2) the ones more
correlated to low piracy rates are private copying and fair use
provisions; (3) statutes that favor copyright holders are associated
with greater rates of digital piracy (and vice versa); and (4) richer
countries show lower levels of copyright infringement, which
validates the development economics theory. Because there is no
existing literature in the field with the scope that this article offers,
these results constitute the first step toward a comprehensive crossnational quantitative study on comparative copyright law and
digital piracy, both in descriptive and explanatory terms.
These outcomes have a straightforward implication for
policymakers when designing copyright regulations, although it
may upset some sectors of the entertainment industry. To fight
digital piracy, legislatures should avoid amendments that increase
protections toward copyright holders (e.g., secondary liability rules
for ISPs). Instead, these results show that the most effective legal
117

Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 2011
Report, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE (2011),
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2011CopyrightIndustriesReport.PDF.
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reforms are pro-consumer, such as fostering private copying or fair
use. Legislators should also continue seeking amendments that
may improve social attitudes, economic indicators, judicial
enforcement, and legal markets for intellectual property goods.
With respect to that ideal panorama to combat piracy in the
copyright field, the current situation in the United States achieves a
high degree of overlap, whereas the one in Spain is much more
limited. This supports the practical reliability of the results and the
suggested policy guidelines laid out in this paper, as there is a clear
connection between these findings and actual digital piracy rates,
at least for the United States and Spain.
These recommendations, which especially target legislatures
and governments, are in line with building a new—and
economically viable—regulatory copyright model. Hopefully, it
may help in reducing piracy rates, correcting the global tension
between authors and consumers in the digital era, and thus leading
society to greater heights of wellbeing.
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VI. APPENDIX
TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable

Observ.

Mean

Stand. Dev.

Min.

Max.

dpiracy

108

58.36

21.76

18

91

sweatbrow

108

0.25

0.44

0

1

softlitwork

108

0.76

0.43

0

1

workforhire

108

0.12

0.33

0

1

collorphanworks

108

0.20

0.40

0

1

performdisplay

108

2.06

0.96

0

3

secliabilityisp

108

1.89

0.75

0

3

moralrights

108

2.19

0.90

0

3

compulsorylicenses

108

0.67

0.47

0

1

collectingagencies

108

1.82

1.14

0

3

privatecopying

108

1.79

1.05

0

3

fairuse

108

1.68

1.08

0

3

firstsale

108

0.75

0.44

0

1

remedies

108

2.14

0.91

0

3

copyleft

108

0.06

0.23

0

1

aggregated

108

0.46

0.18

0

0.74

gdpcapita

108

20,786.51

23,114.95

953.40

110,697

gini

108

37.46

8.66

24.80

65

unemployment

108

8.98

6.04

0.50

29

internetusers

108

55.62

24.87

2.60

96.50

spendinglegitdig.

108

28.45

45.75

0.02

254.66

businessmodels

108

1.55

1.11

0

3

researchdevexp

108

0.95

1.00

0.02

4.04

region

108

2.91

1.38

1

5

adultliteracy

108

91.77

12.64

41

100

oldpopulation

108

10.29

5.90

0.42

25.08

procopsocialnorms

108

3.72

1.19

1.69

6.32

pirateparty

108

0.51

0.50

0

1

enforcement

108

3.97

1.11

1.63

6.19
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TABLE 6. CODING OUTCOMES
Visit https://goo.gl/Khd6ST to download the coding outcomes
spreadsheet. To quickly identify the dichotomy, greener cells in the
Excel file indicate more pro-consumer/pro-free access copyright
regulations, whereas redder cells indicate more pro-copyright
holder provisions.

